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FRICTION TO FIGHT MISINFORMATION: 
CONTENT-NEUTRAL FRICTIVE MEASURES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
The Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Opinion and Expression1 (Special Rapporteur) 
is the position created by the U.N. Human Rights Council to address violations of the freedoms of 
opinion and expression, undertake fact-finding visits to countries, and publish annual reports 
relating to the freedom of opinion and expression.2 In the Special Rapporteur’s upcoming report 
on Disinformation and the freedom of expression,3 they should advocate the use of content neutral 
frictive measures in combating misinformation on social media.  
The first section of this paper provides a synopsis of the Special Rapporteur’s six reports 
on the freedom of opinion and expression in the Information, Communication, Technology sector, 
including Social Media Companies. The first section also discusses the Special Rapporteur’s most 
recent report on disease pandemics. The second section details the international legal framework 
based on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business which is reiterated in the Special Rapporteur’s reports. The third section 
defines frictive measures and what the Special Rapporteur has said about them in their reports. 
The fourth section argues that content neutral frictive measures comply international law, despite 
 
1United Nations Commission on Human Rights, QUESTION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL PERSONS 
SUBJECTED TO ANY FORM OF DETENTION OR IMPRISONMENT, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/L.48 (1993) 
(establishing the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression.).  
2 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/mandate.aspx  (last visited May 2, 2021) 
3 Irene Kahn (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression), 
Disinformation and freedom of opinion and expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/47/25 (Forthcoming June, 2021).  
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the potential for bias and present a viable method of combating disinformation which the Special 
Rapporteur should advocate in their upcoming report.  
I. SYNOPSIS OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR REPORTS 
 Since 2015, the Special Rapporteur has published six reports on freedom of opinion and 
freedom of expression in the Information and Communication Technology sector.4 The 
Information and Communication Technology sector consists of the private actors involved in 
“organizing, accessing, populating and regulating the Internet.”5 Social media companies make up 
part of the ICT sector.6 The Special Rapporteur has written reports on the freedoms of opinion and 
expression in the ICT sector pertaining to: encryption and anonymity;7 role of states and the private 
sector in the digital age;8 the role of digital access providers;9 online content regulation;10 artificial 
intelligence;11 and online hate speech.12 In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Special 
 
4 David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression), Online 
Hate Speech, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/74/486 (Oct. 19, 2019).  
5 David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and e xpression), Freedom 
of Expression, States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/38 (May 11, 2016) 
[hereinafter States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age]. 
6 Kaye, States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 1.  
7 David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression),  The Use 
of Encryption and Anonymity to Exercise the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression in the Digital Age, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/29/32 (May 22, 2015) [hereinafter Encryption and Anonymity] 
8 Kaye, States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5. 
9 David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression) , The Role 
of Digital Access Providers, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/22 (May 30, 2017).  
10 David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression) , Online 
Content Regulation, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018).  
11 David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression) , 
Artificial Intelligence Technologies and Implications for the Information Environment, U.N. Doc. A/73/348 (Aug. 
29, 2018) [hereinafter Artificial Intelligence]. 
12 David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression) , Online 
Hate Speech, U.N. Doc. A/74/486 (October 9, 2019). 
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Rapporteur published in April of 2020 on disease pandemics which discussed public health 
disinformation online.13  
Encryption and Anonymity:  
 The Special Rapporteur’s report on Encryption and Anonymity considers whether the 
rights to privacy, freedom of opinion and expression, include the ability to encrypt or anonymize.14 
The Rapporteur defines encryption as “a mathematical ‘process of converting messages, 
information, or data into a form unreadable by anyone except the intended recipient…’”15 
Anonymity is defined as the “condition of avoiding identification.”16 The report addressed 
concerns that encryption and anonymity would hide criminal activity online.17 While the report 
acknowledges that corporations have a duty to operate under the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business, the report specifically “is focused on State obligations.”18 Ultimately, encryption and 
anonymity are deemed “necessary for the exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression in the digital age.”19 
States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age:  
 In A/HRC/32/38, the Special Rapporteur acknowledges the influence of private actors on 
freedom of expression through the internet and social media.20 The report raises questions 
concerning the protection of freedom of opinion and expression as relating to the private sector 
 
13 David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of  freedom of opinion and expression), Disease 
Pandemics and the Freedom of Opinion and Expression , U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/49 (Apr. 23, 2020) [hereinafter 
Disease Pandemics]. 
14 Encryption and Anonymity, supra note 7, at ¶ 3. 
15 Encryption and Anonymity, supra note 7, at ¶ 7. 
16 Encryption and Anonymity, supra note 7, at ¶ 9. 
17 Encryption and Anonymity, supra note 7, at ¶ 13. 
18 Encryption and Anonymity, supra note 7, at ¶ 17. 
19 Encryption and Anonymity, supra note 7, at ¶ 56. 
20 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 3. 
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online.21 Finally, the report concludes with the Special Rapporteur concludes by offering some 
“normative guidance” in the most needed areas of the ICT sector.22 
 The Special Rapporteur questions companies’ terms of service,23 and raises derivative 
concerns from the lack of clarity in terms of service including “inconsistent enforcement”,24 
“overzealous censorship”,25 “lack of an appeals process”,26 and states’ opportunistically using such 
ambiguity to remove objectionable content.27 For private actors, the primary source of regulation 
on their platforms is their terms of service.28 These terms of service are formulated in such a way 
that makes it difficult for users to predict what content is restricted on the private actor’s platform.29 
Moving to content regulation, the Special Rapporteur examines the “design and engineering 
choices” of social media, recognizing that social media companies curation of content affects 
user’s access to information.30 Such inconsistent enforcement and limitation of information poses 
threats to the freedom of opinion and expression.31  
The Role of Digital Access Providers:  
 Beginning in 2016, the Special Rapporteur began the process of detailing the different 
facets of the “information and communications technology (ICT) sector.”32 The report outlines 
state obligations, under international law, to protect expression online.33 The Rapporteur condemns 
 
21 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 3. 
22 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 3. 
23 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 37. 
24 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 52. 
25 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 52. 
26 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 52. 
27 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 53. 
28 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 52. 
29 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 52. 
30 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 55. 
31 States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at ¶ 52. 
32 The Role of Digital Access Providers, supra note 9, at ¶ 4. 
33 The Role of Digital Access Providers, supra note 9, at ¶ 5. 
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internet and telecommunications shutdowns34 and cautions that accessing online user information 
can interfere with privacy rights.35 The role of digital access providers is also discussed, and the 
Rapporteur recognizes that access as critical to the freedom of expression.36 
Online Content Regulation:  
 The Special Rapporteur’s report on online content regulation “…focuses on the regulation 
of user-generated content, principally by States and social media companies…”37 Moderation 
describes “the process by which Internet companies determine whether user-generated content 
meets the standards articulated in their terms of service and  other rules.”38 The report expresses 
concerns about national laws restricting speech across borders.39 Because many social media 
companies have an international user base, “national laws are inappropriate for companies that 
seek common norms.”40 In lieu of national laws, the Special Rapporteur advocates compliance 
with the UN Guiding Principles on Business as an international framework for the content 
moderation policies of social media companies.41 
 The UN Guiding Principles on Business “and their accompanying body of ‘soft law’”,42 
inform the Rapporteur’s substantive standards for content moderation.43 When developing 
standards, companies should seek policy that allows platforms “…for users to develop opinions, 
express themselves freely and access information of all kinds in a manner consistent with human 
 
34 The Role of Digital Access Providers, supra note 9, at ¶ 8.  
35 The Role of Digital Access Providers, supra note 9, at ¶ 17. 
36 The Role of Digital Access Providers, supra note 9, at ¶ 29. 
37 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 3.  
38 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 3. 
39 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 18. 
40 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 41. 
41 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 6. 
42 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 42. 
43 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 44, 
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rights law.”44 Part of content moderation policy should include a standard of non-discrimination 
which requires companies to “transcend formalistic approaches” and “take into account the 
concerns of communities historically at risk of censorship and discrimination.”45 
 The report ends with the recommendations of Special Rapporteur, including recognition 
that human rights law is “the authoritative global standard for ensuring freedom of expression” on 
social media,46 and “smart” content moderation as opposed to “heavy-handed viewpoint-based 
regulation.”47 
AI and Free Speech:  
The Special Rapporteur’s report on AI and Free Speech has three goals: “define key terms 
essential to a human rights discussion about AI; identify the human rights legal framework relevant 
to AI; and present some preliminary recommendations to ensure that, as the technologies 
comprising AI evolve, human rights considerations are baked into that process.”48 Artificial 
Intelligence is defined as “a ‘constellation’ of processes and technologies enabling computers to 
complement or replace specific tasks otherwise performed by humans, such as making decisions 
and solving problems.”49 The Rapporteur urges caution against removing human intervention from 
content moderation through the promotion of artificial intelligence.50  
 
44 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 45. 
45 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 48. 
46 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 70.  
47 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 66.  
48 Artificial Intelligence, supra note 11 at, ¶ 2.  
49 Artificial Intelligence, supra note 11 at, ¶ 3.  
50 Artificial Intelligence, supra note 11 at, ¶ 6. 
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Concerning AI and Social Media, the Special Rapporteur notes areas of concern in content 
display, personalization,51 content moderation and removal.52 Because Social media companies 
tailor content based on user preferences, users might experience a total absence of “diverse views, 
interfering with individual agency to seek and share ideas and opinions across ideological, political 
or societal divisions.”53 The Special Rapporteur reaffirms their advocacy for an international legal 
framework for Social Media companies to follow, calling attention to the right of freedom of 
opinion which “requires freedom from undue coercion.”54 
Online Hate Speech:  
 The Special Rapporteur’s report on Hate Speech Online discusses “Governments 
considering regulatory options and companies determining how to respect human rights online.”55 
While the report offers no concrete definition of Hate Speech, the Rapporteur cites ICCPR Article 
20 Section, which prohibits “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”.56 Supplementing the definition, the report cites 
the 2013 Rabat Plan definitions of “‘Hatred’ and “hostility” refer to intense and irrational emotions 
of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards the target group.”57 The Rapporteur clarifies that 
hateful expression does not always “constitute advocacy or incitement.”58 
 Social Media companies are criticized in the report for operating with a business model 
that values the spread of hateful content.59 Simultaneously, the Special Rapporteur warns of 
 
51 Artificial Intelligence, supra note 11 at, ¶ 10. 
52 Artificial Intelligence, supra note 11 at, ¶ 13. 
53 Artificial Intelligence, supra note 11, at ¶ 12. 
54 Artificial Intelligence, supra note 11, at ¶ 23. 
55 Online Hate Speech, supra note 12, at ¶ 2. 
56 Online Hate Speech, supra note 12, at ¶ 8. 
57 Online Hate Speech, supra note 12, at ¶ 6. 
58 Online Hate Speech, supra note 12, at ¶ 20. 
59 Online Hate Speech, supra note 12, at ¶ 40. 
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ambiguous definitions of hate speech in Social Media policy and of automated content mod eration 
that “is notoriously bad at evaluating context.”60 To improve their moderation policies, the 
Rapporteur recommends “de-amplification, de-monetization, education, counter-speech.”61  
Disease Pandemics:  
 In the wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic, the Special Rapporteur issued a report detailing 
five challenges to freedom of opinion and expression.62 One of the five challenges discussed is the 
spread of Public Health Disinformation.63 The Special Rapporteur recognized the need to engage 
“rumors in order to correct them” whilst cautioning against disproportionate punishment for 
sharing disinformation.64 The Special Rapporteur also acknowledged Social Media’s “enormous 
impact on public discourse and the rights of individuals on and off their platforms.”65 To assist in 
stemming the flow of disinformation, Social Media companies “should aim towards maximum 
transparency of their policies and engage” with both public authorities and affected communities.66  
II.INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 
 The Special Rapporteur calls upon social media companies to tailor their content 
moderation policy based on an international law framework. National laws are an insufficient basis 
for content moderation policy because Social Media Companies involve a “geographically and 
culturally diverse user base.”67 The Special Rapporteur presents an international law framework 
 
60 Online Hate Speech, supra note 12, at ¶ 50. 
61 Online Hate Speech, supra note 12, at ¶ 58. 
62 Disease Pandemics, supra note 13, at ¶ 6. 
63Disease Pandemics, supra note 13, at ¶ 41. 
64 Disease Pandemics, supra note 13, at ¶ 42. 
65 Disease Pandemics, supra note 13, at ¶ 52. 
66 Disease Pandemics, supra note 13, at ¶ 52. 
67 Online Content Regulation, supra note 10 at, ¶ 41. 
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in their reports based on the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,68 and the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.69 The Special Rapporteur uniformly 
cites ICCPR Art. 19, General Comment 34 to Article 19, and UN Guiding Principles on business 
for social media companies and the ICT sector in general.70 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Art. 19 
 The purpose of the ICCPR, explained in its preamble, is to promote “civil and political 
freedom…”71 The ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966.72 Article 
19 of the ICCPR protects the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of opinion.73  
 As part of the rights to hold opinions and freedom of expression, Article 19 delineates 
important qualifications clarifying the breadth of those rights.74 Not only does the Art. 19 protect 
the right to hold opinions, but to “hold opinions without interference.”75 The right to freedom of 
expression under Art. 19, includes “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds…through any other media of his choice.”76 However, Art. 19 also delineates when 
restrictions to the freedom of expression are acceptable. 
Art. 19 allows derogation to protect the rights and reputation of others, “national 
security…public order…public health or morals.”77 Under ICCPR Art. 4, states may derogate from 
 
68 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
69 UN Office of High Commissioner on Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. 
Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (June 16, 2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
70 See States and the Private Sector in the Digital Age, supra note 2, at ¶ 5 and ¶ 9; The Role of Digital Access 
Providers, supra note 6, at ¶ 5 and ¶ 45; Online Hate Speech, supra note 9 at ¶ 5 and ¶ 47. 
71 ICCPR, supra note 68, at 1. 
72 ICCPR, supra note 68, at 1. 
73 ICCPR, supra note 68, at art. 19. 
74 ICCPR, supra note 68, at art. 19. 
75 ICCPR, supra note 68, at art. 19. 
76 ICCPR, supra note 68, at art. 19. 
77 ICCPR, supra note 68, at art. 19(3)(a)-(b). 
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their obligations under the treaty excepting some articles.78 Such derogation cannot be inconsistent 
with international law and cannot “involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, 
sex, language, religion or social origin.”79 Restrictions under Art. 19 must be “provided by law 
and…necessary.”80 Restrictions can be applied to the freedom of expression, but not the freedom 
of opinion.81 To further clarify the extent of protections under Art. 19 and the requirements for 
restrictions on the freedom of expression, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations 
issued General Comment No. 34.82 
General Comment No. 34  
General Comment No. 34 was published in July 2011.83 While the ICCPR binds state 
parties, the obligations under Art. 19 require states to protect people “from any acts by private 
persons or entities” infringing upon the freedoms of opinion and expression.84  
Comment No. 34 addresses the right to freedom of expression in media,85 to access 
information,86 to political rights,87 and the scope of restrictions to expression.88 “Internet-based 
modes of expression” are protected by Art. 19. The Comment reiterates that no restriction upon 
the holding of an opinion nor impairments on other rights because one holds an opinion are 
 
78 ICCPR, supra note 68, at art. 4(1). 
79 ICCPR, supra note 68, at art. 4(1). 
80 ICCPR, supra note 68, at art. 19. 
81 See U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19 Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 9, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter General Comment No. 34]; States and the Private Sector in 
the Digital Age, supra note 2 at ¶ 7. 
82 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 5.  
83 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 5. 
84 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 7.. 
85 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 13. 
86 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 18. 
87 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 20. 
88 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 37. 
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permissible.89 Part of the freedom to hold opinions is the prohibition on coercion to hold or not 
hold an opinion.90 
Comment No. 34 clarifies the requirements of Art. 19(3) restrictions of the freedom of 
expression.91 In addition to the requirements of legality, for the legitimate purposes listed in 
19(3)(a-b), and the restrictions must be necessary and proportional.92  
The Comment goes into detail about what it means for a restriction to be required by law.93 
To be a law, means that a regulation is not merely discretionary, is sufficiently precise, and publicly 
available to allow people to tailor their conduct accordingly.94 
The extent of legitimate grounds—or legitimacy—for the restrictions to the freedom of 
expression are also clarified in the Comment.95 Restrictions are permissible to protect rights under 
international law, both to individuals and members of a community.96 While national security is a 
legitimate purpose for a restriction on expression, states must take care to ensure such restrictions 
take “extreme care” to conform with the requirements of Art. 19.97 Finally, the comment explains 
that the legitimate grounds must no stem from any single social, philosophical or religious 
tradition.98 
 
89 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 9. 
90 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 10. 
91 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 35. 
92 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 13. 
93 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 24. 
94 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 25. 
95 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 28. 
96 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 28. 
97 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 30. 
98 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 32. 
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For a restriction to be proportionate, it must not be overbroad .99 Considering the form of 
expression restricted along with its method of dissemination, the restriction must be the least 
intrusive option to be proportionate.100  
To show the necessity of a restriction on the freedom on expression, there must be “a direct 
and immediate connection between the expression and the threat .”101  
The Comment also outlines “certain specific areas” where restrictions should have a 
limited scope and are subject to greater scrutiny.102 The value placed on uninhibited expression 
relating to political discourse is particularly high by the ICCPR.103 Accordingly, the Comment 
expresses the Committee’s concern for restrictions relating to political discourse.104 Concerning 
websites and blogs, the Committee explains that restrictions by the state need to meet the Art. 19 
requirements and cannot be based on prohibiting material critical of the government.105 While 
Art.19 and its subsequent commentary detail state obligations including protections against private 
actors infringing upon the freedom of expression, the UN Guiding Principles directly address 
business’ role in protecting human rights. 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
 The UN Guiding Principles outline “The State Duty to Protect Human Rights”, “The 
Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights”, and “Access to Remedy.”106 In addition to 
reaffirming states’ duty to protect against human rights abuse,107 when business enterprises are 
 
99 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 34. 
100 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 34. 
101 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 34. 
102 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 37. 
103  General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 38. 
104 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 38. 
105 General Comment No. 34, supra note 81, at ¶ 43. 
106 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at iii. 
107 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at 1. 
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owned or controlled by the states, additional steps to protect against human rights abuse and 
oversight are encouraged.108 Although the principles do not have the force of law, they provide a 
method of enhancing business practices to protect human rights.109  
 The UN Guiding Principles state that “business enterprises should respect human 
rights.”110 For business to respect human rights at a minimum, they must not violate the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.111 Respecting such rights includes preventing negative impacts to 
human rights through their business activities as well as from business relationships.112 The 
responsibility to protect human rights regardless of the size of the business enterprise.113 However, 
businesses can craft their means of addressing and protecting human rights according to their size 
and circumstances.114  
 The Guiding Principles, recommend a policy commitment by businesses to protect human 
rights.115 The policy should be holistic, recognized at “the most senior level of the business”, 
informed by expertise, made publicly available and reflected through operational policies.116 Part 
of the policy should include a due diligence assessment to determine the potential adverse human 
rights impact of business practices.117 Upon assessment, business should implement the findings 
“across relevant and internal functions” affecting decision-making.118 The effectiveness of 
 
108 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at 4. 
109 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at 1.  
110 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at princ. 11.  
111 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at princ. 12.  
112 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at princ. 13.  
113 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at princ. 14. 
114 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at princ. 15. 
115 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at princ. 16. 
116 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at princ. 16. 
117 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at princ. 17. 
118 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at princ. 19. 
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response should be tracked by the business.119 Communication between stakeholders effected by 
the human rights impact of businesses is expected.120 When businesses come to learn that their 
practices have had adverse impacts on human rights, “they should provide for or cooperate in their 
remediation.121  
 Finally, the UN Guiding Principles outline principles to provide access to remedy for 
persons experiencing an adverse impact on human rights from business practices.122 States have 
duty to provide remedy “through judicial, administrative, legislative, or other appropriate 
means.”123 Businesses are recommended to have “effective operational-level grievance 
mechanisms” so effected persons and their communities can have direct access to remedy.124 
Operational-level grievance mechanisms help identify potential adverse impacts of business 
practices along with allowing grievances to be addressed and remedy before they escalate.125 These 
mechanisms need not require a grievance that reaches the level of a human rights abuse, but rather 
should seek to act when legitimate concerns are identified.126 
Special Rapporteur on International Law 
 The Special Rapporteur identifies the freedoms protected in Article 19 as the basis for a 
wide range of human rights and are the foundation for free and democratic society.127 The language 
 
119 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at princ. 20. 
120 Guiding Principles, supra note 69  at princ. 21. 
121 Guiding Principles, supra note 69  at princ. 22. 
122 Guiding Principles, supra note 69 at princ. 25. 
123 Guiding Principles, supra note 69  at princ. 25. 
124 Guiding Principles, supra note 69  at princ. 29. 
125 Guiding Principles, supra note 69  at princ. 29. 
126 Guiding Principles, supra note 69  at princ. 29. 
127 See Online Hate Speech, supra note 4, at ¶ 5; Encryption and Anonymity, supra note 4, at ¶ 22. 
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of Art. 19 is consciously devoid of a list of relevant media because the rights of freedom of opinion 
and expression accommodated future technological advances.128  
The Special Rapporteur uses the framework of Article 19 of the ICCPR to determine the 
conditions for restrictions on the freedom of expression to comply with international law.129 The 
conditions are legality, necessity and proportionality, and Legitimacy.130 The usefulness, 
reasonableness, and desirability of a restriction is neither dispositive nor sufficient to demonstrate 
any of requirements for the restriction under Article 19.131 The requirements for the restrictions 
are “to be applied strictly and in good faith, with robust and transparent oversight.132 The burden 
of justifying the restriction falls on the authority imposing the restriction rather than the speakers 
subject to it.133  
A/HRC/29/32 includes a discussion on how the storage, transmission, and security of 
information in the digital age effect the right to freedom of opinion.134 Because State and non-state 
actors have control over the storage, transmission, and security of information online, they both 
have the ability to interfere with rights in Art. 19 of the ICCPR. The right to freedom of opinion 
includes the ability to come to an opinion through reasoning, prohibiting undue coercion.135 
Offering preferential treatment to induce acceptance of an opinion could also constitute 
impermissible coercive conduct violating Art. 19.136 The Special Rapporteur recognized in 
 
128 Encryption and Anonymity, supra note 4, at ¶ 26. 
129 Online Content Regulation , supra note 10 at, ¶ 66; Artificial Intelligence, supra note 11, at ¶ 28; Online Hate 
Speech, supra note 12, at ¶ 6; Disease Pandemics, supra note 13, at ¶ 11. 
130 Online Content Regulation , supra note 10 at, ¶ 7; Artificial Intelligence, supra note 11, at ¶ 28; Online Hate 
Speech, supra note 12, at ¶ 6; Disease Pandemics, supra note 13, at ¶ 11. 
131 Disease Pandemics, supra note 13, at ¶ 15. 
132 Online Hate Speech, supra note 12, at ¶ 7. 
133 Online Hate Speech, supra note 12, at ¶ 6. 
134 Encryption and Anonymity, supra note 7, at ¶ 12. 
135 Artificial Intelligence, supra note 11, at ¶ 23. 
136 Artificial Intelligence, supra note 11, at ¶ 23. 
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A/73/348 that content curation effects the ability to formulate opinions and “raises novel questions 
about the types of coercion or inducement that may be considered an interference.”137  
In recognizing the impact of ICT’s, the Special Rapporteur has consistently reiterated that 
companies should apply international law and “apply human rights principles in their 
operations.”138 Rather than applying throughout business practices, most companies apply human 
rights principles in response to demands from the states.139 In the A/HRC/38/35, the Special 
Rapporteur succinctly articulates the UN Guiding Principles’ minimum standards for business 
practices as an operative framework for companies to use: 
(a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts and seek to prevent 
or mitigate such impacts directly linked to their operations, products or services by their 
business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts (principle 
13); 
(b) Make high-level policy commitments to respect the human rights of their users 
(principle 16); 
(c) Conduct due diligence that identifies, addresses and accounts for actual and 
potential human rights impacts of their activities, including through regular risk and 
impact assessments, meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups and 
other stakeholders, and appropriate follow-up action that mitigates or prevents these 
impacts (principles 17−19); 
(d) Engage in prevention and mitigation strategies that respect principles of 
internationally recognized human rights to the greatest extent possible when faced 
with conflicting local law requirements (principle 23); 
(e) Conduct ongoing review of their efforts to respect rights, including through regular 
consultation with stakeholders, and frequent, accessible and effective communication 
with affected groups and the public (principles 20−21); 
(f) Provide appropriate remediation, including through operational-level grievance 
mechanisms that users may access without aggravating their “sense of 
disempowerment” (principles 22, 29 and 31).140  
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While this framework is not meant to carry the weight of law, it does provide an aspirational 
standard for businesses.141 One area that social media companies can assess their impact on the 
right to freedom of expression is the effect of frictionless sharing,142 on their platforms and how it 
leads to misinformation.143  
III.FRICTIVE MEASURES DEFINED 
 In media policy, there exists a concept called the “signal-to-noise ratio.”144 Signal 
represents truthful information that supports democratic discourse.145 Noise represents content that 
misinforms and undermines discourse.146 As various kinds of content are amplified by algorithms 
on social media, it can become difficult to distinguish between signal and noise.147 Friction can be 
introduced to help distinguish between the two. 
Friction can be defined as the force that resists between two bodies.148 To resist can be 
defined as “to exert force in opposition.”149 Taken together, friction can be understood as the force 
exerted in opposition to the relative motion between two bodies in contact. In digital platforms 
seeking to streamline the flow of information, friction is an obstacle to be overcome.150 However, 
whether friction is good or bad depends upon the force it is acting against.151 Friction can act “to 
disincentivize and disrupt practices that addict, surveil, and dull critical functions.”152 Frictive 
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measures are forms of creating such friction and their goal is to “open pathways for reflection.”153 
While not exhaustive, the Knight Institute has identified three forms of friction relevant to digital 
platforms: “communication delays, virality disruptions, and taxes.”154  
Communication delays are a form of frictive measures that seek to systematize a pause.155 
There is some research to suggest that people are “more likely to resist manipulative 
communications” when they have the time to “raise cognitive defenses.”156 In live broadcast 
media, short delays are already implemented for the sake of quality control.157 In the stock market, 
the IEX ensure a degree of friction by running all trades through extra cable to avoid any trader 
from having an advantage by getting their information first.158 A pause by way of communication 
delay gives people the time to think about the fidelity of information they are considering, to 
distinguish between signal and noise.159  
 Virality Disruptors are a form of frictive measure that disrupt traffic once “a certain 
threshold of circulation” is reached.160 Virality can be understood as the quality of “triggering 
quick, emotionally, intense responses.”161 Disrupting virality would involve a pause both for the 
user to process the incoming information and also, to allow content moderation through human 
review to ensure compliance of the disrupted communication.162 Moderation is defined as “the 
process by which internet companies determine whether user-generated content meets the 
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standards articulated in their terms of service and other rules.163 In the financial markets, a similar 
disruptive measure called a circuit-breaker is used to stop the flow of information that could 
overwhelm traders and contribute to instability.164 When information flows result in a certain 
threshold of volatility in financial markets, regulators like the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
commission and the New York Stock Exchange can activate a circuit-breaker to cause a disruption. 
This disruption’s purpose is to allow time to process information and make informed decisions, 
“to create the space for the exercise of cognitive autonomy.”165 Disruption to virality on digital 
platforms, allowing for time to process and, also for content moderation can limit the spread of 
noise.166 
 Taxes can act as frictive measures to encourage businesses to avoid boosting noise over 
signal.167 Taxes can act as friction by making companies suffer a financial cost for monetizing the 
virality of communication.168 The revenue from such taxes could be put to use by supporting the 
production of signal.169  
Frictive Measures in the Special Rapporteur’s Reports 
 The Special Rapporteur recommends that companies in the ICT sector recognize the 
standard for freedom of expression is not based on the law of any state nor private interest, but 
rather human rights law.170 Additionally, they recommend that companies engage in “smart 
regulation” focused on transparency and remediation, allowing people to choose whether to engage 
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in digital platforms.171 Companies should not engage in viewpoint-based regulation.172 At a 
minimum content moderation of digital platforms should be based on the UN Guiding Principles 
on business and restrictions to the freedom of expression should conform to the requirements of: 
Legality, Necessity and Proportionality, and legitimacy.173 The Special Rapporteur also 
recognized a standard of non-discrimination in content moderation which required transcending 
formalistic approaches and considering “communities historically at risk of censorship and 
discrimination.”174 
The Special Rapporteur has acknowledged that digital platforms of Internet companies 
operate with a business model that benefits from attention and virality.175 Artificial Intelligence 
and algorithmic personalization are “optimized for engagement and virality at scale.”176 However, 
this preference for virality can threaten individual’s ability to find some content.177 Because digital 
platforms value virality, content with lower levels of engagement can be deprioritized making 
some content obscure.178  
The Special Rapporteur recognizes that companies engage in content moderation and 
predicate access to their digital platforms upon compliance with user agreements and terms of 
service.179 A major flaw in companies’ content moderation practices is a lack of transparency.180 
Automated content moderation creates risks that content moderation might violate human rights 
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law.181 Some methods of company moderation that the Special Rapporteur has touched on include: 
automated flagging; automated removal; automated pre-publication filtering; user flagging of 
impermissible content; trusted flagging; human evaluation; action by the company against the 
account or content; notification; appeals and remedies.182 Additionally, the Special Rapporteur 
expressed concern at the prospect of promoting counter-narrative to user communications on 
digital platforms.183 Use of such counter-narratives could transform digital platforms into 
propaganda carriers.184 While the Special Rapporteur has acknowledged a myriad of content 
moderation tools, some which might even have the effect of creating friction, they have not directly 
advocated the use of frictive measures. 
Despite not expressly using the term frictive measures, the Special rapporteur has 
recognized that companies have content moderation tools that can restrict the virality of 
communications and include a “range of options short of deletion.”185 In countering the spread of 
disinformation—noise—on digital platforms, particularly in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
rumors must be addressed in order to correct them.186 However, state penalization of 
disinformation is not proportionate and can deter communication of valuable information.187  
IV.FRICTIVE MEASURES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 
 Although states, not business, are parties to the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights,188 the international law framework outlined in the special rapporteur’s reports can 
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be applied to assess restrictions on the freedom of expression by social media companies. Frictive 
measures would have to satisfy the requirements of: Legality; Necessity and Proportionality; and 
Legitimacy.189 Additionally, social media companies are covered under the UN Guiding Principles 
of Business and Human Rights.190 Accordingly, frictive measures can be assessed under the 
framework of assessing restrictions to the freedom of expression under the ICCPR and 
recommendations of the UN Guiding Principles on Business.  
Communication Delays 
 Systematizing a pause would be unlikely to violate either he freedoms under Art. 19 of the 
ICCPR or the Guiding Principles.  
 Legality 
 To be legal, a regulation must be publicly available and sufficiently precise for people to 
conform to the regulation.191 Nothing about a communication delay would be illegal under the law 
because it would be content neutral meaning that people subject to the restriction would not have 
to change their behavior in a meaningful. So long as companies publicly inform users that they 
implement communication delays, such regulation would be publicly available. 
 Necessity and Proportionality 
 Communication delays comply with the requirement of necessity because of their benefit 
in reduction of noise on social media.192 To demonstrate necessity, the body issuing the restriction 
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to freedom of expression needs to show a direct and immediate connection between the kind of 
expression and the threat.193 In the context of digital platforms, the threat is disproportionate noise 
in the signal to noise ratio.194 Frictionless sharing degrades the quality of information being 
shared.195 The immediacy connection comes with the virality of the communication that is 
promoted through business models thriving on such virality.196 On most social media, publication 
of communication is almost instantaneous.197 The restriction of a communication delay allows for 
the creation of time for cognitive processing before information is shared.198 
Because delaying communication falls short of the most extreme restriction of deletion, it 
would likely qualify as proportionate. Considering the form of expression restricted along with its 
method of dissemination, the restriction must be the least intrusive option to be proportionate.199 
Because social media companies have the capacity to delete content from their platforms, any 
restriction short of deletion would be short of the most restrictive option.200 While it is likely 
untenable to create an exhaustive list of potential restrictions and assign a level to intrusiveness to 
each, simply creating a delay in the message does not compare to silencing the message in its 
entirety through deletion.  
 Legitimacy 
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Communication delays qualify as legitimate restrictions to the freedom of expressions 
because they help protect rights under international law.201 Some legitimate purposes for 
restrictions on the freedom of expression included in the language of Art. 19 are, “national 
security…public order…public health or morals.” (Art. 19, pg 11, 3(a)(b)). The purpose of 
communication delays is to boost signal, truthful information that supports democratic discourse. 
(Digital Information Fidelity and Friction, pg 2). The promotion of truthful, democratic discourse 
would likely be considered furtherance of public order and accordingly, legitimate.  
Virality Disruptors 
 For much of the same reasons as Communication Delays, Virality Disruptors would likely 
be permissible under Art. 19’s international legal framework. However, because virality disruptors 
can be used to allow time for content moderation, there is increased likelihood for viewpoint 
discrimination. For this reason, it is valuable to distinguish between disrupting of the virality of 
content and disrupting virality for the purposes of determining whether a communication should 
be deleted. In this context, I choose to focus on virality disruptors “to create the space for the 
exercise of cognitive autonomy.”202  
 Legality 
 So long as the implementation of virality disruptors on social media platforms is made 
publicly available and is sufficiently precise to allow individuals to tailor their conduct,203 virality 
disruptors are legal under international law. 
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Necessity and Proportionality 
Virality disruptors seek the same goal as communication delays, to reduce noise.204 
Whereas frictionless sharing increases noise,205 the introduction of a pause at a certain threshold 
of circulation allows for time to “exercise of cognitive autonomy.”206 The expression of frictionless 
threatens to drown out signal with noise,207 but a virality disruptor introduces friction in the hopes 
of increasing signal by allowing time to process. The immediate connection between the threat of 
noise and the expression of frictionless sharing should be sufficient to fulfill the necessity 
requirement of Art. 19.208  
Because slowing the spread of information by way of virality disruptors falls short of 
deleting the content or censorship, there is a strong likelihood that such frictive measures would 
be proportional for the same reasons as communication delays.  
Legitimacy 
Virality disruptors help protect rights under international law by increasing the amount of 
signal, thereby supporting democratic discourse and public order. Instead of allow discourse on 
social media to be dominated by frictionless, quick, emotional responses, disrupting the virality of 
a communication allows more time for processing and increases the ability for cognitive choice. 
Cognitive choice helps democratic discourse by allowing people to make their intent a conscious 
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decision as opposed to an assumed intent based on a frictionless architecture.209 Supporting 
democratic discourse would benefit public order and sufficiently legitimize virality disruptors.210  
Frictive Measures under the UN Guiding Principles  
 Whereas Art. 19 has an analytical framework which can be readily applied to restrictions 
on freedom of expression to determine if they comply with international law, the UN Guiding 
Principles provide for business to better comply with human rights law.211 Frictive measures that 
are permissible under international law can be used to help businesses including social media 
companies comply with the UN Guiding Principles.  
 Frictive measures provide an opportunity for social media companies engage in 
“prevention and mitigation strategies” of the adverse impact their business can have on human 
rights212  Frictionless sharing is built into the architecture of social media companies.213  
Frictionless sharing results in noise,214 and noise undermines the discursive potential of democratic 
discourse.215 Frictive measures prevent and mitigate noise overwhelming signal on social media.216 
Specifically, Communication Delays and frictive measures can prevent and mitigate noise on 
social media,217 without viewpoint discrimination.218 
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 While frictive measures will not satisfy all the UN Guiding Principles,219 they provide an 
opportunity for social media companies to promote democratic discourse on their platforms and 
mitigate adverse impacts on human rights. 
Concerns about AI 
 Despite the benefits of frictive measures, they are likely considered a form of artificial 
intelligence and are susceptible to the same kinds of discrimination posed by artificial intelligence.  
Artificial Intelligence is defined by the Special Rapporteur in, A/73/348, as a collection of 
technologies that allow computers to reinforce or replace tasks done by humans.220 The Special 
Rapporteur has identified the “potential for AI to embed and perpetuate bias and 
discrimination…in the exercise of freedom of opinion and expression.”221 Discriminatory effects 
and bias in artificial intelligence are produced by the data sets in the design of the intelligence.222 
Additionally, the lack of transparency around the manner artificial intelligence effects the 
information environment prevents people “from understanding when and according to what metric 
information is disseminated, restricted or targeted.”223  
 On social media, the content users see and information personalized for their viewing is 
often dictated by artificial intelligence.224 Massive amounts of data including “browsing histories, 
semantic and sentiment analyses” are entered into algorithms to curate information displayed to 
users.225 Social media companies use subjective assessments to gauge how interesting content will 
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be to a user, thereby limiting exposure to different perspective across ideological or political 
lines.226 Artificial intelligence optimized for user engagement, promotes virality and demotes 
independent and user-generated content,227, thus promoting a noisy, frictionless information 
environment.228  
 In addition to determining what content is seen by users, artificial intelligence is also 
involved in content moderation and removal.229 The Special Rapporteur has raised concerns about 
AI-driven content moderation, expressly recognizing the limited ability for artificial intelligence 
to account for linguistic and cultural context.230 The exclusion of information by AI-driven content 
moderation and removal “increases the risk of manipulation of individual users through the spread 
of disinformation” by limiting diverse perspectives.231  
 While nothing inherent to frictive measures requires that they be carried out through 
artificial intelligence, there is no reason computer technology cannot be used in implementing 
frictive measures. If measures like communication delays and virality disruptors are implemented 
using artificial intelligence, they are at risk for the kinds of discrimination and bias that threaten 
the freedoms of opinion and expression online.232 While the potential for bias in implementing 
frictive measures is worth acknowledging, the potential bias does not necessarily change their 
legality under the international law framework reiterated by the Special Rapporteur.  
CONCLUSION: 
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 Frictionless sharing on social media degrades information quality on social media.233 
Degradation of information quality increases noise which misinforms.234 One way for the social 
media companies to combat misinformation on social media is to introduce frictive measures 
which would result in boosting signal by slowing information flows and allowing time to raise 
cognitive defenses.235 Communication delays and virality disruptors present new frictions that can 
be implemented in a content neutral way.236 Content neutral frictive measures are especially 
valuable because they most readily comply with the international framework identified by the 
Special Rapporteur, based on the ICCPR and UN Guiding Principles on Business.  
 In the last seven special rapporteur reports discussing the freedom of opinion and 
expression in the ICT sector, frictive measures have not been mentioned by name.  While concerns 
about states using their power to restrict speech through private actors like social media companies 
is a very legitimate concern, so too is limiting the spread of disinformation. In the Special 
Rapporteur’s upcoming report on Disinformation and freedom of opinion and expression, the 
Special Rapporteur should analyze and advocate the measures social media companies have at 
their disposal to combat disinformation. Content neutral frictive measures comply with 
international law and present a viable bulwark against the proliferation against disinformation 
online. 
 
233 The Law of Friction, supra 142 at 46. 
234 Digital Information Fidelity and Friction , supra 143 at 2. 
235Digital Information Fidelity and Friction , supra 143 at 22. 
236 Digital Information Fidelity and Friction , supra 143 at 21. 
